I) INTRODUCTION
There is an old Yiddish joke about a man and his grandson in Belarus who set out by foot from Pinsk to Minsk. They were halfway through their journey, when they come across a field extending as far as the eye could see, with a sign in front that read: "Private Property No Trespassers Allowed." The boy, worried, looked up at his grandfather and asked how they will get to Minsk since, as the sign expressly forbids it, they cannot cross the field. The grandfather looks at the lad, and tells him that he has read the sign incorrectly. He explains that all texts have implied parts, and that they can only be unlocked by engaging the text in all its parts. The sign, This canard illustrates how relatively minor assumptions about a text may completely invert its intended meaning. The story makes inherent sense in its context because Hebrew is a language devoid of vowels and certain grammatical symbols, requiring the reader to assume these meaningful markings. Furthermore, there is a long tradition culminating in the Babylonian Talmud that involves students and rabbis engaging in similar grammatical acrobatics with important texts. This story could also make sense in the context of labor relations, because the founding text of that field has continually had background presumptions read into it, often creating something that is the opposite of what the text actually says. This has created an a piece of legislation that feels weak, timid, ineffectual as applied, belying the strong statutory language and purpose of the original act.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was passed in 1935 with the dual purposes of promoting industrial peace and pushing back against the Depression by laying the groundwork for a more equitable distribution of wealth. 1 The Act was passed after a great deal of debate and opposition, and was hesitantly signed into law by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Though it was a radical statute passed in the course of a host of ambitious New Deal legislation, the NLRA was not well-liked by President Roosevelt, and in many ways it was not really a part of the New Deal. 2 But, just as with several other foundational statutes passed during the 1930's, the NLRA remains, with a few amendments, the foundation of American labor law.
Unfortunately, the NLRA has never been construed as it was written. The Supreme Court has performed tortured readings of the NLRA in order to make sense of language that seems to be a radical departure from common law property rights and laissez-faire managerial rights. As such, the Act has had a different life than the 74 th Congress perhaps intended. This paper will examine the NLRA and some of the seminal cases that have interpreted it in order to understand the role that property rights-a term and concept that does not appear in the Act but has had an enormous impact on its interpretation and implementation-have in labor
relations. This analysis will proceed by first examining the history and passage of the NLRA.
Particular attention will be paid to the §2(3) definition of "employee" and how it relates to employees' §7 rights. Next, the paper will analyze the Supreme Court's implementation of the Act, and the manner in which it injected property rights into the analysis. This section will focus on the ways that property rights have come to overshadow employee rights. analysis will be the need for real balancing of particular interests implicated. After reviewing the ways that the Court has treated organizer access, the Occupation Safety and Health Act will be looked at in order to understand how statutes that have analogous property intrusions have been dealt with. Finally, after disposing of the absolute managerial property rights scheme that the courts have relied upon, this paper will suggest an alternative scheme that is more in line with the original purpose and language of the NLRA. This scheme rejects the Lochner-era common law notions of property that have become judicially embedded into the Act, and instead proposes an approach that does not presume and promote conflict between the employer and the employees.
Through a different understanding of property rights in the Labor arena, the ideals of common enterprise, collective bargaining, and industrial peace can be more fully realized in the labor setting.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE NLRA
The National Labor Relations Act has only been amended twice since its passage in
1935-the first time in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments and the second time in the 1959
Landrum-Griffin Act. Since that time, there have been numerous attempts to amend or modify the NLRA in order to better suit the modern workplace, but further changes have been unsuccessful. Largely then, it is the original 75 year old statute that still governs labormanagement relations in the workplace. The NLRA is a radical statute that was a product of its time-and perhaps could have only been passed during its time-and to understand it, one must understand the period in which it was passed. Employees in the early part of the century were at the mercy of large employers who were industrializing at a rapid pace. During this time, workers who tried to organize in order to bargain collectively met resistance from both the employers and the government. Employers used mass-firings, "yellow-dog" contracts that conditioned employment on a promise of nonorganization, and violence in order to prevent unionization of workers. George W. Norris, the Senator who co-authored the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, has described the "yellow-dog" contracts used in the early part of the century as a form of "semi-servitude." 4 The employee "practically signed away his liberties. He surrendered his right to ask for increased wages, for better working conditions, or to associate with his fellow workers in giving effectiveness to any attempt to procure changes in these working conditions." 5 In perhaps one of the greatest instances of legislative irony, employers began using the Sherman Act of 1890 in order to enlist the judiciary in blocking unionization. 6 Though the Sherman Act was intended to protect the economy from industrial monopolies, the industries successfully argued that labor was a commodity and unions were such monopolies. 7 Using this argument, employers were able to get federal judges to issue injunctions against strikes and other organizing activities, and were thus able to have the federal government execute and subsidize anti-union enforcement. 8 The labor injunction was one of the most powerful weapons that employers could use against employees, because with it came the power and imprimatur of the state. Congress reacted to this state of affairs by passing the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914.
Section 6 declared that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor…or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof." 11 Section 20 further states that "no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States…unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property." 12 The founder of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Samuel Gompers, ecstatically proclaimed that the Clayton Act was the "Magna Carta upon which the working people will rear their structure of industrial freedom." 13 Gompers and others saw the Clayton Act as a freeing of the workingman to match his labor against the employer's capital in bargaining.
The Supreme Court responded to this by saying that the Act's main effect was to codify the existing common law. President Wilson, who reluctantly signed the Clayton Act on his last day in office, sent the pen that he used to sign the Clayton Act to Samuel Gompers with a note about the Section 20 of the Clayton Act which said labor is not a commodity, but a part of an integral part of an individual's life: "I am sorry that there were any judges in the United States to finally accomplish what the Clayton Act could not. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed at the nadir of commerce clause power by Congress, so rather than mandating certain labor rules, it simply removed the federal government from the equation. The Norris-Laguardia Act made "yellow-dog" contracts, which condition employment upon promise that the employee will not organize, unenforceable in federal courts and removed from the jurisdiction of federal courts the power to issue an injunction in a labor dispute. Essentially, the Act made it official policy that the courts were not to decide on the wisdom of a job action or take sides in a labor dispute. that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest…" 24 The Wagner Act then declared that it was the government's policy that workers should bargain collectively.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
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Many of the same workers who previously feared both the employer and the federal government when they tried to organize, now had assurance that the government supported their cause. declaration or a statute that merely asserts that the press shall be free, that religions shall be free, is not effective unless and until those acts which deny freedom to the press and deny religious freedom are defined, forbidden and punished.
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After analogizing the Act to the First Amendment, and indicating that the Act will serve as a tool
to show people what is in conflict with justice, Senator Walsh described the purpose of the Act in much less lofty terms.
The bill indicates the method and manner in which employees may organize, the method and manner of selecting their representatives or spokesmen, and leads them to the office door of their employer with the legal authority to negotiate for their fellow employees. The bill does not go beyond the office door. It leaves the discussion between the employer and the employee, and the agreements which they may or may not make, voluntary and with that sacredness and solemnity to a voluntary agreement with which both parties to an agreement should be enshrouded.
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This seeming tension within the NLRA, between the high and low, is often what confuses the Court. At its core, the NLRA is a simple piece of legislation, not unlike constitutional principles of freedom of association or speech. But it would be a mistake to presume that this simplicity simply left things as they were prior to passage of the Act.
C. The Definition of "Employee"-Its History and Implications Important to understanding §7 of the NLRA is the definitions section. These definitions are not obvious, and proceed along policy considerations. For instance §2(2) of the Act excludes as "employers" the United States government, state government, the Federal Reserve Bank, any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, or a labor organization. 31 The definition of "employee"
is of great importance in the Act, as only statutory employees receive the Act's protection. or anyone who works for the government. It is not that the labor of these workers is worth any less, but rather Congress decided for policy reasons to exclude them from the coverage of the Act. The Supreme Court in turn has had no difficulty in construing the Act to contain these exclusions, and thereby deny statutory protections to individuals who are, in every sense but the statutory, employees.
Similarly, the NLRA also expands the definition of "employees" in certain ways that do not comport with our everyday understanding of employees, but receive coverage and protection for policy reasons. A prime example of such an expansion is that "the term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer."
37
Though this definition may not be in line with the common law as it existed prior to passage of the Act-or, for that matter, how it exists now-and it might not comport with our common definition abandons reference to a particular employer, and instead states that if an individual does not fall under one of the exclusions then one is an employee. In other words, if an employee is a statutory employee for one employer then she is a statutory employee for all employers. The distinction between employees and nonemployees is spelled out in §2(3) of the NLRA, and is explicitly taken out of the hands of individual companies' human resource departments.
It is hard to imagine how Congress could have made this definition more clear than it is in the NLRA. And any arguments about it being inserted accidentally or that Congress intended an alternate reading are countered by the political and legislative history of the Act. "Congress wrestled with the definition for over a year as it sought to ensure that the rights granted in §7
were meaningful, and the result was a definition that is not tied to the employer-employee relationship." and reworked drafts of the Act, and considered almost every provision and its implications in detail. 39 The definition of "employee" was no exception. In his report to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, the Chairman of the committee, Senator David Walsh analyzed the Act.
In this analysis, he refers to the most important of the definitions as those of "employer" and "employee." 40 For this reason, the issue of defining an "employee" arose many times over the course of the debates and hearings. An example of the difficulties encountered in trying to 38 Ellen Dannin, supra note 33. 39 A rough count indicates that in the course of the 16 months that the bill was being considered by Congress there were no fewer than 9 Senate drafts of the bill, 7 Director of the Automobile Manufacturers Association, raised the issue that the definition of "employee" was broad enough to include employees with no relation to the employer:
We wish to call attention to several specific features of the proposed measure. Take, for example, the definition of the term "employee", as stated in paragraph (3) of section 2 of the bill. It reads:
The term "employee"***shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer unless the act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice. 41 Mr. Ellard:…Section 8 of the Bill lists four unfair labor practices. It will be noted that these so-called "unfair labor practices" all relate to acts by the employer. In other words, unfair labor practices can only result from acts of the employer. Unquestionably, employment creates mutual obligations and liabilities, and it seems very strange indeed that only one party of such a relationship can be guilty of an unfair practice arising out of that relationship. Paragraph (9) of section 2 makes a labor dispute include any controversy, regardless of whether the disputant stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee. Yet this bill provides no restraint upon third parties who disturb the employer and employee relationship, although such third parties have it within their power to create the labor dispute and bring about the very things for which the employer may be condemned under this bill… [Mr. Ellard goes on to talk of the problems of including workers who have left their positions as "employees".]
Senator Wagner: There is a very high authority that a striker is still an employee? Mr. Ellard: Yes, I so understand. Senator Wagner: I mean legal authority. Mr. Ellard: That is right, but this goes further and says a person who is away from his employment by reason of any unfair labor practice maintains his status as an employee, and that is the difference I see in this proposition.
In that connection, what is the status of an employee, do you mean an employee for the purpose of this job, or do you mean an employee with all of the implications and responsibilities that go with an employee. It is an open invitation to employees in plants wholly unrelated to a particular plant where no difficulties exist to stir up trouble in that plant. It encourages agitators everywhere to foment sympathetic strikes. In section 2 are listed various definitions of terms. These definitions are for the most part self-explanatory. The committee wishes to emphasize the need for the recognition as expressed in subsections 3 and 9, that disputes may arise regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee, and that self-organization of employees may extend beyond a single plant or employer. This is so plain as to require no great elaboration.
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On its face, the NLRA seems to give effect to Justice Holmes famous dissent in the case of Vegelahn v. Guntner, written almost 40 years prior to the NLRA, that labor must be put in a position of equal bargaining power in the workplace. 45 The Act clearly identifies worker organizations that could have equal bargaining power, and thereby bargain for collective agreements, as the solution to deep workplace problems. The Act further identifies the employer as being the wellspring of the problem in the labor market, and carves out a field of protection wherein the employer may not intrude. 46 Further, the employee is identified not in reference to her particular employer, but in a more functional sense. 47 If an individual performs work and does not manage people, or perhaps is of the working class subject to several limitations, then that individual is a statutory employee. As such, an employer has the same restrictions in regard to an employee who works at her company as she does to an employee who works for another company, or for a union. These provisions of the Act show that though the Act may have been a product of its time, it was not in continuity with previous employment legislation. It was a paradigm shifting statute.
This understanding of statutory employees is important in understanding the NLRA because it speaks to the broad rights that were afforded to all workers in pursuit of organized activities. These rights were a sharp departure from the preexisting labor conditions, and they speak to a new conception of the worker, her work, and the workplace. Important to this analysis is that employer property rights are not mentioned as a consideration in the NLRA at all. This is especially important considering the fact that prior legislation, such as the Clayton Act-which in part led to the NLRA-explicitly balanced employee rights against employer property weighed abstract property rights against abstract employee rights. Rather, it balanced the specific rights of the employees not to suffer the unfair labor practices listed above against the employer's specific property damages. 56 The Supreme Court reversed the Board's holding and looked more to common law property rights than to the NLRA in holding that the employer was warranted in firing the employees for their concerted activities.
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The Fansteel Court accepted the Board's findings of serious unfair labor practices, but found the employees' resort to "violence against the employer's property" to be unacceptable.
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Even though the Board found that most of the property damage was caused by the employer and the police in their use of bombs and tear gas to force the employees to leave the plant, 59 the Supreme Court was satisfied in finding that the employees' actions in some way led to the property damage. Where the Board viewed the police and employer reaction as a superceding cause that led to the property damage and thereby did not make the employee's liable, the Supreme Court viewed the workers' job action as a superceding cause that freed the employer for liability stemming from its unfair labor practice. The Fansteel Court ultimately held that the right to employ or terminate is a basic right of the employer, and it is inconceivable that the NLRA fundamentally changed that feature of the workplace.
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The Fansteel Court has a difficult time understanding the actual legal changes that the It is apparent under that construction of the Act that had there been no strike, and employees had been guilty of unlawful conduct in seizing or committing depredations upon the property of their employer, that conduct would have been good reason for discharge, as discharge on that ground would not be for the purpose of intimidating or coercing employees with respect to their right of selforganization or representation, or because of any lawful union activity, but would rest upon an independent and adequate basis. From this perspective, the NLRA changed nothing; it merely reiterated that employers may not engage in illegal conduct toward their employees.
The Fansteel Court next finds it difficult to understand the difference between an employee in the statutory within the meaning of the statute as opposed to an employee as used in everyday parlance. Though the NLRA defined "employees" in §2(3) to include those "whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because The portion of the definition of "employee" above was included precisely because
Congress recognized that employers could easily circumvent the purpose of the NLRA by simply firing employees and thereby stripping them of all protections that come from that status.
Therefore, the definition employed by Congress of an employee is one that does not depend on the employer. The Court finds it difficult to understand that a worker may remain a statutory employee and receive all the protections that adhere with that status without remaining in the actual employ of the employer. In other words, an employer retains the right to discharge an employee, but it does not have the right to remove the label and protections of "employee" from him.
Stemming from this misconception, the Fansteel Court treats the employee only in terms of her relationship to the employer. Because employees are licensees on the employer's property and may only act in a way permitted by their license, the Court viewed any job action, where workers worked according to their own terms, a trespass. 66 Unlike an unfair labor practice by the employer, once the employees committed a trespass everything that flowed from that act was illegal. The Supreme Court did not consider the possibility that the absolute property rights that 64 29 USC §152(3). 65 Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 255. 66 Id.
employers may have enjoyed before the passage of the NLRA may have been abridged by the NLRA in order to protect employees and promote industrial peace.
B. Republic Aviation and the Narrow Exception
Where Fansteel took a hard line against job actions on employer property, Republic
Aviation said that an employer may not interfere with an employee's organizing rights unless it showed evidence that special circumstances make necessary such interference "in order to maintain production or discipline." 67 In Republic Aviation, unfair labor practices were alleged where the employer discharged an employee for passing out union application cards in violation of the company's "no solicitation" policy. 68 The Board held that the "no solicitation" rule violated the NLRA by interfering with the employees' protected organizational rights, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
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The Republic Aviation plant was not located in an isolated location or in a place that would make it difficult to access the workers. 70 The company raised the argument that there was no showing that the location of the plant or its physical characteristics made it difficult for employees to be accessed, and that therefore the Court should rule that no right of access existed. 71 The Supreme Court agreed with the fact that there was no evidence that the plant's location "made solicitation away from company property ineffective to reach prospective union employer's premises or be seriously handicapped." The Court went on to reject the company's argument that such a handicap must be shown, and said that the right of access, irrespective of the ease of alternatives, is at the heart of the NLRA.
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In a concession to the employer, the Court did affirm the Board's statement that rules prohibiting union solicitation are presumptively unreasonable and discriminatory "in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline." 74 The Republic Aviation Court was not employing the robust §2(3) definition of "employee" in order to allow for union access to employees, but rather the very basic right of employees to hear the union's message. In doing so, the Court discussed mining camps and lumber camps in order to say that it was irrelevant that the company was not similar to one of these work sites that had previously been considered by the Board. In effect, the Court was saying that the burden was on the employer to show that union access created an unreasonable hardship on the running of the company, rather than on the union to show that it had no other means to reach the employees. This balancing of property rights against employee rights proceeds along a fairly discrete path, where specific damages and rights are weighed. The Court looked at the employees' right to hear the union's message for organizing activity against the injury upon the employer by having its rights of exclusive use mildly diminished. Furthermore, it allowed for a narrow exception of allowing infringement of organizing activity when the employer could show that the activity interfered with production or discipline. the employees it was trying to reach were so isolated, and there was no other reasonable means of reaching the employees. 84 The Supreme Court in a subsequent case interpreting Babcock described the burden as "a heavy one" because the union's act of trying to disseminate literature to employees was "trespassory organizational activity." 85 Under the terms of the NLRA, this phrase should have been written as an oxymoron, or a narrow exception at best. The NLRA carved out organizational rights precisely so that "employees" would not be considered trespassers when they were organizing. This narrow reading of union rights is even narrower than it first appears and has often been held almost nonexistent, such as in the case of NLRB v.
Sioux City and New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc.
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In Sioux City, the union tried to reach employees who worked aboard a barge. The employees lived aboard the barges and spent between 30-60 consecutive days working. When not working, the employees scattered across 15 states. 87 The union hired 10 organizers to try to telephone employees, used speedboats to pull alongside the barges and throw literature aboard, and tried to speak with loudspeakers from the speedboats. 88 Even after these intense efforts, the union was only able to reach 35 out of 118 employees. 89 The employer refused to allow the union access and the Board found that it was an unfair labor practice. Though it was not literally a mining or logging camp, it appeared to be the functional equivalent because workers lived aboard the barge, and it was severed from normal lines of communication. 
D. Lechmere and the Exception as the Rule
Lechmere took the Babcock standard to its extreme and finally stated that it is the employer's property rights that are of ultimate importance in considering the question of union access to employees. 91 Lechmere involved a union that was trying to reach employees of a retail store in a shopping plaza off of a highway. The union organizers had little success in taking advertisements out in the local newspaper, so they resorted to placing handbills on the windshields of cars parked in a lot used mostly by employees. 92 Managers of the store told the organizers that they could not handbill in the parking lot and that they had to leave the area.
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The Board found that this action constituted an unfair labor practice, If what the Court performs in labor cases can be called balancing, it closer to categorical balancing than it is to ad hoc balancing. In each of the seminal cases recounted above the Court makes a rule of general applicability that seems to only require the identification of the status of the party. In Fansteel, the Court held that employees may not engage in job actions on employer's property. In Republic Aviation, the Court held that employers must permit employee access to other employees for purposes of organizing. In Babcock, the Court held that union organizers are non-employees. In Lechmere, the Court held that organizer access may be proscribed by an employer so long as there is a conceivable alternative form of access. The process that the Court uses in each of these cases is not pure categorical balancing because the Court arrives at the rules not by looking at each party's interests at a high level of abstraction and then weighing them. Employer property rights are looked at abstractly, but employee organizational rights are looked at in specificity. Even where there is no injury to the employer's property, the Court looks at the abstract intrusion upon property, or the infringement upon exclusive use, and balances it against the employees' specific rights to receive the information in question. In such a balance, an employee's right to hear a Teamster organizer's information of pay differentials in a work area parking lot will rarely trump the employer's categorical property rights. It is too easy for the Court to simply say that the message can be received in another place or another manner, without regard to the problems involving knowing the names and contact information of the employees, issues of accessing them in a timely manner that is amenable to a representation election, and the morale problems attached to a union where the organizers seem to be unable to do something as seemingly minor as reaching employees. The Court then creates rules of general applicability with exceptions so narrow that they are merely nominal.
The Supreme Court should proceed along an ad hoc balancing path when considering employee rights as against employer property rights. The statutory inclusion of a broad category of individuals under the term "employee" does not lend itself to the jurisprudence of labels that the Court has created. The NLRA does not allow for a general rule that deals with individuals who do not work for a particular employer, because under the NLRA they are all "employees" with prescribed protections. Because all "employees" receive a certain level of statutory protections, the Court should look at the facts of individual cases in order to determine what the discrete interests and injuries are in each case. These should be balanced using a set of factors that the Court develops in order to make them commensurate.
V. POSSIBLE BALANCING APPROACHES TO PROPERTY RIGHTS
There are several possible well-developed forms that such balancing could take, including private nuisance, easement, or Average Reciprocity of Advantages. Though a private theory may not work in practice because the issue in employment cases involves physical intrusion of property, private nuisance can serve as an analogy to show the benefits of such balancing in a property context. In addition, the NLRA can be read as producing a limited easement for "employees" for organizing purposes on employer property. This approach differs slightly from the private nuisance approach because rather than balancing the interests of the parties, it provides an allowance within the narrow scope of activities. Similarly, the approach of the Average Reciprocity of Advantages provides a balancing model that balances property rights against societies interests in its limited infringement.
The property rights that the Supreme Court accords employers seems closest to the property rights that are given to persons in their own home. It is an almost absolute form that holds anyone in defiance of the property owner's wishes to be in violation of trespass. The tort of trespass flows from the property owner's right to exclusive use. 109 Trespass is a strict liability offense that does not require damage to property or a showing of intent or negligence. balance, but it would also appropriately shift the burden to the employer. This approach is in fact similar to the Republic Aviation approach that held that the company may not deny access unless such access unreasonably interferes with the company's production or the maintenance of 109 Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5 th Edition, §13. 110 Id. 111 Id.
-32- The biggest hurdle to viewing the union's actions as a private nuisance rather than a trespass is that the union is physically invading the employer's property, rather than merely affecting his use in the land.
113 " [T] respass is an invasion in the exclusive possession of his land, while nuisance is an interference with his use and enjoyment of it. The difference is that between walking across his lawn and establishing a bawdy house next door." 114 This hurdle is perhaps insurmountable, making private nuisance an unworkable framework for labor-employer relationships. But even if the category does not fit practically, its logic and internal inquiry help illustrate the advantages to a balanced approach that lives beyond the world of trespass.
B. Organizing as a Limited Easement
The Court could have also avoided the difficult task of trying to call a physical invasion a private nuisance if it had read the NLRA as having created an easement, whereby statutory employees may conduct certain limited protected activities. The easement would be limited and would only apply to organizing activities, or in the language of the NLRA, "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 115 If, in wishing to 112 Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803-04, note 10. 113 Prosser, supra note 109, §87. 114 Id. In the labor context, the Reciprocity of Advantage doctrine could be used in order to find that the organizing access allowed by the NLRA is not a taking under the 5 th Amendment. The doctrine requires an inquiry into the property interests affected as against the benefits gained by society and the company. The NLRA lays out the problems, and the sources of the problems, that it seeks to remedy in its first section, thereby offering a description of the benefits that Congress intended. 128 It states that employers have created an imbalanced power structure that has led to industrial strife that ripples through society as a whole.
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NLRA section 1 paints two pictures of society and work, employers and employees. It first shows a society being destroyed as a result of a power imbalance in the workplace. It then explores how this unequal power between employers and employees came about. Finally, section 1 sets out its vision for a new society built on a balance of power. This vision is rooted in the workplace, but with effects felt throughout society.
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The goals of the NLRA are to create harmony and stability that protects employees, employers, and society. The almost intuitive rationale that unions create higher labor costs, which adversely affect a company's profitability and competitiveness, is more complicated then it first appears.
Though it would seem that the lower an employer's labor costs are the more profits it can make, this assumption has historically proven to be false. An early example of this can be found in alienation from the work-product. In response, Ford doubled the pay for autoworkers to $5 per day, and his competitors foresaw his ruin. Ford famously commented that "a low wage business is always insecure," and though his labor costs doubled, his business proved more profitable. 132 Beyond the predictions of greater industrial and societal peace from increased organization and collective bargaining, economic research has shown that unionized companies have greater productivity than their non-unionized counterparts. 133 Though unionized workers have increased wages and benefits, the companies have decreased turnover, more experienced workers, and better hiring practices. 134 The gains of a unionized workforce have been quantified across a broad spectrum of industries: the lower turnover rate in unionized manufacturing companies led to a 20% productivity increase; 135 the decreased need for close supervision of construction employees led to a 10% productivity increase. 136 In addition, unionized companies have increased employee morale, and have shown to have far more joint employee-management initiatives. 137 Combined, these factors lead to greater productivity differentials in unionized companies over non-unionized companies in America and around the world. 138 The stated purpose of the NLRA, mixed with empirical data of the benefits of unionized workforces, show that the side of the equation that looks to the benefits to society and the company are quite high.
Next, it must be asked what property rights are affected by allowing "employee" access for purposes of organizing. Assuming that the access is reasonable and does not allow for interference with production or discipline, then the only interest affected is exclusive use. As a property owner, one has the right to exclusive use of the property as against all others. This right is of great importance with regard to one's residence, but it is a myth to hold the right as absolute even in this setting. If one is connected to utilities, then one must allow property access to gas meter readers, water utilities, and phone line operators. The right of exclusive use is even less important in the workplace, because an employer must allow access to safety inspectors, licensing agencies when applicable, and cannot exclude along certain discriminatory lines. are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments." 140 This purpose is quite similar to the explicit problems described in the NLRA. The NLRA stated that the strife caused by lack of collective bargaining had the "intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce…" 141 Furthermore, the Act stated that "the inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers…tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners…"
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In both statutes, the concerns are internal employment procedures that have widereaching effects on society through commerce. Furthermore, both statutes recognize that the employees and employers are engaged in a common enterprise that would be more efficient and mutually beneficial if the parties worked together. In OSHA, the statute states:
the Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy…to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources…by encouraging joint labormanagement efforts to reduce injuries and disease arising out of employment.
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In the NLRA, the statute states:
In order to further its stated purposes, OSHA provides for a regime of inspection of 147 and these warrants do not require a demonstration of probable cause similar to the criminal setting. 148 The warrants can be issued upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an…inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment." 149 This requirement simply requires an OSHA agent to recount to a judge the neutral criteria in place that led to the selection of the targeted employer and the general program that the inspection is intended to further. 150 The warrant requirement protects the property rights of the employers from searches only insofar as they are not being unfairly targeted, but it still allows for fairly wide-reaching on-site inspections.
The significant difference between access to employer property for purposes of inspection under OSHA and for purposes of organizing under the NLRA is the status of the individuals who are seeking access. In the OSHA context it is state actors who are seeking access, whereas under the NLRA it is private individuals who are seeking access. Having government employees enter the employers' property for purposes of organizing would be antithetical to the entire scheme of the NLRA. The NLRA is premised upon the idea of government neutrality. The Act provides certain ground rules in order to allow employees to organize and bargain collectively if they so desire, but it does not intervene in substantive matters or in promoting union membership. The government only intervenes in order to act as a referee in certification elections and when one side has violated the Act. interpreting employee rights than simply being bound by the employer's property rights. OSHA
shows that infringement upon property rights are acceptable for purposes of health and safety of the workplace and society. For unstated reasons, they are unacceptable for purposes of employee workplace rights, benefits, pay, and voice.
VII. POSSIBLE RATIONALES IN INJECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS INTO THE NLRA
The Supreme Court, from Fansteel, Republic Aviation, and Babcock in the first half of the century, to Lechmere more recently, has construed the NLRA in a very peculiar way. It has injected a particular understanding of employer property rights, but it has never explained the source of these rights or the rationales in giving them such weight. Property rights have crept into the equation, and it appears that no one objected. Though the Board, and even the Supreme Court, first weighed access to employees in promotion of §7 rights heavily, they always weighed them against an incredibly strong form of background property rights of the employer. Perhaps it seemed so natural that no explanation was ever necessary for the source of these rights, how broad their scope was, or if they were consistent with the NLRA. Therefore, the Supreme Court has never really provided an explanation for what has become an almost absolute federal property right that may in fact be greater than most states' common law property rights.
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Therefore it is important to question some of the arguments and rationales that led to this form of property rights in the workplace. strong argument for judicially incorporating them into the Act. But where they are in conflict with the purpose of the Act, and they serve as obstacles to achieving its objectives, it should be examined if the 74 th Congress intended to abridge those rights.
The NLRA seems to explicitly exclude employer property rights. Though preceding legislation that greatly influenced the NLRA, such as the Clayton Act, specifically brought property into the equation in protecting workers' rights, the NLRA specifically did not include property language. 154 Section 20 of the Clayton Act states that "no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States…unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property." 155 The Supreme Court has read the silence in the NLRA to mean that Congress intended to adopt the contemporaneous common law property rights into the Act, and the first step in an analysis of the NLRA must first preserve these rights as an undisturbed whole. Justice
Reed found property and employee rights as stemming from the same source, and therefore existing on the same plane when he wrote in his majority opinion in Babcock, that "organizing rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property rights." 156 But property rights are not granted by the national government; they are granted by state law. Federal law simply protects private property from being taken without just compensation. 157 And as the Supreme Court held in Lucas-decided in the same term as
Lechmere-a regulation which abridges one of the bundle of property rights that does not 
